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This paper compares the 1995 Kobe earthquake with the more recent one in Tohoku. 
The impact of the recent earthquake on industrial production was much larger and 
long-lasting than that of the 1995 earthquake. We find that very little of this can be 
explained by differences in government expenditures or private consumption. 
However, we find very substantial differences in energy production in the wake of 
the two earthquakes. The substantial and persistent drop in energy output is likely 
to have exacerbated supply disruptions and may continue to slow the pace of 
recovery. Moreover, we provide some evidence that Japan’s increasing reliance on 
fossil fuel sources of energy is  likely to result in a large number of deaths and 
increases in morbidity due to increased air pollution. These results highlight the 
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On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Tokyo time, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 occurred
oﬀ the coast of Japan in the western Paciﬁc. The quake triggered a massive tsunami
that reached the eastern coast of Japan within minutes. The eﬀects of the dual-
tragedy were immediate: 19,996 people lost their lives, 275,258 homes were destroyed,
and another 580,559 houses were damaged.
Nearly a year after the tragedy, Japan is still working to reorganize, rebuild, and
reassert itself as an international power. This paper outlines the economic eﬀects of
the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami and presents steps that Japan must take to move
forward. A comparison with the 1995 Kobe earthquake suggests that policy decisions
to reduce reliance on nuclear energy in the short run are hampering Japan’s recovery.
The reopening of reactors at the Takahama, Kashiwazaki Kariwa, and Tomari plants
is promising both in terms of economic recovery and long-term health outcomes. A
move from nuclear power to fossil fuels would likely result in far more fatalities than
those arising from radiation.
Japan has the unfortunate distinction of being a country that has suﬀered a dis-
proportionate number of catastrophic events. Not only is Japan prone to earthquakes
and other natural disasters, but many Japanese cities were devasted by bombings dur-
ing World War II. Davis and Weinstein (2002) analyze the impacts of these events
and provide some relatively optimistic news for the aﬀected regions: populations and
industries tend to recover in the wake of these catastrophic events. While we hope
that the impact of the current earthquake is comparable, in this paper we examine to
what extent policy decisions have aﬀected the trajectory of recovery from the recent
disaster.
Over the last 100 years, there have been nine earthquakes in Japan that have killed
over 1,000 people (USG, 2011). Of these, the 1995 Kobe eathquake and the recent
Tohoku disaster were two of the worst three events in terms of causualties. To examine
the success, speed, and lasting implications of the recovery, we compare the 1995 and
2011 disasters from a policy standpoint.
11 Kobe and Tohoku Compared
Figure 1: Comparison of Magnitude: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Kobe Tohoku
Dead and Missing 6,400 19,996
Partial/Total Collapsed Homes 240,956 275,258
Damaged Homes NA 580,559
GDP Share of Impact Area (Narrow) 4% 4%
GDP Share of Impact Area (Broad) 11% 6%
Total Cost Y9,900 bil NA
Gov’t Reconstruction Exp Y5,020 bil Y12,100 bil
Source: Government of Japan
Figure 1 provides basic statistics for both earthquakes. As one can see from
the ﬁgure, the 2011 dual-disaster resulted in three times as many casualties as
the 1995 earthquake. However, the results from Davis and Weinstein (2002)
suggest that the destruction of capital stock is a better metric than lives lost for
understanding the economic impact of a catastrophic event. In the case of the
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, the Japanese Cabinet Oﬃce estimated
that the damage to physical capital amounted to 1% of the total national stock.
Similarly, the Kobe earthquake’s damage to physical capital amounted to 0.8%
of the total national stock at the time (Drysdale, 2011). Moreover, the fact that
the number of collapsed homes was comparable to the 1995 earthquake suggests
that the two events were comparable in this dimension. The events are also
not very diﬀerent if one compares the share of GDP that was produced in the
prefecture most aﬀected by the earthquake or the prefectures with substantial
damage.
Market reactions tell a somewhat similar tale. As one can see from Figure
2,1 the market reactions to the two events were comparable. Stocks were down
4.3% three weeks after the Kobe earthquake as compared to 6.9% after Tohoku.
For both events, the decline was more pronounced over the course of the next
few weeks.
Diﬀerences between the disasters start to emerge when we turn our attention
1In Figure 2 and in subsequent ﬁgures, we rescale the data such that “Day 0,” “Month 0,”
and “Quarter 0” correspond to the day, month, and quarter of the earthquake, respectively.
For the Kobe earthquake, “Day 0” is January 17, 1995; “Month 0” is January, 1995; and
“Quarter 0” is Q1 1995. For the Tohoku diaster, “Day 0” is March 11, 2011 and “Month 0”
is March, 2011. Since the recent disaster hit at the end of Q1 2011, we denote Q2 2011 as
“Quarter 0.”
2Figure 2: Comparison of Eﬀect on Nikkei 225: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Notes: The Nikkei 225 is to 100 on the day before the disaster, and day-to-day percent
changes are used to adjust the index on the other days accordingly.
to growth rates. In the quarter leading up to each earthquake, growth was
similar with quarterly growth rates of -1.03% and -1.69%, respectively. However,
looking to Figure 3, we see that growth was 1 percentage point higher in the
quarter following the Kobe earthquake than it was in the quarter following the
Tohoku disaster. While both earthquakes occurred during cyclical downturns,
the recovery was faster after the 1995 disaster. In the quarter following the Kobe
earthquake, GDP rose by 0.58% as compared with -0.50% – a gap of 1.08%.
Further highlighting the slower recovery, Figure 4 compares industrial pro-
duction after each disaster. While it is apparent from this ﬁgure that the Indus-
trial Production Index fell more sharply following the Tohoku disaster, it is also
clear that industrial production has recovered more slowly. While industrial pro-
duction had returned to pre-quake levels within a month and a half of the Kobe
earthquake, industrial production was still only 96% of pre-quake production
nine months after the Tohoku disaster. Furthermore, the initial sharp upward
trend leveled oﬀ, suggesting that the general level of industrial production will
be lower for some time.
These diﬀerences in the rates of recovery bring about an important question
with substantial policy implications: What explains the slow recovery? Think-
3Figure 3: Comparison of Eﬀect on GDP Growth: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: OECD StatExtracts
ing in simple economic terms, the slow recovery could either be the result of
reduced demand, stagnating supply, or both.
Demand On the demand side, there are three potential suspects: slow gov-
ernment stimulus, low foreign demand due to yen appreciation, and cutback in
domestic demand due to “self-restraint” in the wake of the crisis. As the next
three ﬁgures indicate, none of these explanations seem likely. In Figure 5, we
do see that government spending rose more sharply after the 1995 earthquake,
but this diﬀerence in ﬁscal response only accounts for about 8% of the diﬀerence
in GDP performance. Figure 6 demonstrates that despite the media attention
given to reductions in spending following the Tohoku earthquake, consumption
behavior was quite similar to what followed the Kobe earthquake. Therefore, the
decrease in demand due to “self-restraint” is probably not important in under-
standing the diﬀerential recoveries. Lastly, in Figure 7, we see that appreciation
of the yen was much steeper in 1995 than in 2011. While a stronger yen has
arguably hurt Japan’s export-heavy economy, declining foreign demand is not
to blame for the slower recovery after the recent disaster.
4Figure 4: Comparison of Eﬀect on Industrial Production: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: METI
Notes: The Industrial Production Index is set to 100 in the month before the disaster, and
month-to-month percent changes are used to adjust industrial production in the other
months accordingly.
Figure 5: Comparison of Eﬀect on Government Spending: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: OECD Statistics
5Figure 6: Comparison of Eﬀect on Private Consumption: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: OECD Statistics
Notes: Contributions to growth are seasonally adjusted.
Figure 7: Comparison of Eﬀect on Exchange Rates: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: Bank of Japan, Bank of England
Notes: Exchange rates are set to 1 in the month before the disaster, and month-to-
month percent changes are used to adjust exchange rates in the other months accord-
ingly.
6Supply Turning to the supply side, Figure 8 suggests that there has been
a substantial decrease in supply. The rapid increase in the Corporate Goods
Price Index coupled with falling output indicates a dramatic contraction in the
supply of goods. What is to blame for this decrease in supply? Much attention
has been given to the disruption of supply chains as a result of the disaster.
Many upstream industries were located in the aﬀected areas, and thus disrup-
tions to local supply aﬀected production across Japan. While this argument
certainly holds in the short term, it is unlikely that supply chain disruptions
are to blame for Japan’s continued low output. Assuming some substitutability
in the production of intermediate goods, one would expect to see much lower
output levels in areas aﬀected by the earthquake than in unaﬀected areas if
supply chain disruptions were still the constraint. This is not the case: 83% of
ﬁrms in unaﬀected areas and 80% of ﬁrms in aﬀected areas were producing at
or above pre-quake levels by June of 2011 (GoJ, 2011). The fact that produc-
tion rebounded nearly uniformly across Japan suggests that there was a general
supply shock that did not only aﬀect the production of goods in areas directly
aﬀected by the disaster.
Figure 9 is the missing piece of the puzzle: energy production in Japan not
only fell in the month of the disaster, but it continued to fall in the following
months. Although only 11 nuclear power plants were directly aﬀected by the
earthquake and tsunami, communities around the country have refused to let
reactors that were closed for routine maintenance to be restarted. As a result
of this opposition, only 3 of the 54 nuclear reactors are currently functioning. It
was not until last November, nearly seven months after the Fukushima disaster,
that the ﬁrst idled nuclear reactor was permitted to reopen. Given that nuclear
power once provided nearly a quarter of Japan’s electricity, the idled reactors
are having widespread repurcussions. Although Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
is determined to restart all idled reactors by this summer, it is not clear whether
or not he will be able to achieve this goal.
2 The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster
The combination of the spectacle of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima and
the relatively unknown eﬀects of exposure to nuclear radiation have led to
widespread opposition to nuclear power. Once seen as a safe alternative to
fossil fuels and the future of energy production, countries across the globe have
7Figure 8: Comparison of Eﬀect on Corporate Goods Price Index: 1995 vs. 2011
Disasters
Source: Bank of Japan
Notes: The CGPI is set to 100 in the month before the disaster, and month-to-month
percent changes are used to adjust the CPGI in the other months accordingly.
begun to turn-away from nuclear power. Following the Fukushima crisis, Ger-
many said that it would close all of its nuclear power plants by 2022. In the
United States, no new nuclear power plant has been built since the much smaller
Three Mile Island event in 1979.
Is this retreat from nuclear power justiﬁed from a public health standpoint?
Not necessarily. Estimates of the number of cancer deaths due to the release
of radiation range from zero (Normile, 2011) to 1,000 (von Hippel, 2011). By
contrast, the shift from nuclear energy to fossil fuel sources is likely to produce a
large number of deaths due to the release of combustion byproducts. Figure 10
shows the number of deaths and cases of morbidity per terawatt hour derived
from diﬀerent energy sources. Despite the spectacular events at Chernobyl
and Fukushima, nuclear power still appears to be a much safer alternative to
fossil fuels. To put these numbers in persepective, Japan’s nuclear power plants
produced around 265.8 TWh of energy prior to the earthquake (Lavelle and
Mulligan, 2011). If Japan were to replace these sources with coal-based plants,
there would be approximately 15,241 deaths per year as a direct result of the
8Figure 9: Comparison of Eﬀect on Energy Production: 1995 vs. 2011 Disasters
Source: CEIC Data Manager
Notes: Figures are sesonally adjusted. Energy production is set to 100 in the month
before the disaster, and month-to-month percent changes are used to adjust energy
production in the other months accordingly.
shift. Similarly, a shift to oil-based energy sources would cause approximately
4,891 deaths per year. Pollutants from fossil fuels also cause a number of serious
illnesses, such as congestive heart failure and chronic bronchitis. A move toward
coal or oil sources would likely cause between 139,013 and 42,794 cases of such
illnesses, respectively.
While dying from a nuclear catastrophe is more spectacular than dying
slowly from consequences of air pollution, other forms of energy are not without
their spectacles: the Iraq war, Japan’s entry into World War II, the BP oil spill,
not to mention global warming, are all events that can be tied to countries’
reliance on fossil fuels. Although there is still a long way to go to make nuclear
energy suﬃciently safe, it is far from clear that other energy sources are less
dangerous options.
3 Looking to the Future
This policy brief suggests that Japan is facing some diﬃcult choices. The sudden
move away from nuclear power is likely to have serious economic and health
9Figure 10: Health Eﬀects of Electricity Generation in Europe by Primary Energy
Source (Deaths/Cases per TWh)
Deaths from Accidents Air Pollution-Related Deaths
Public Occupational Deaths* Serious Illness** Minor Illness***
Lignite 0.02 0.10 32.6 298 17,676
Coal 0.02 0.10 24.5 225 13,288
Gas 0.02 0.001 2.8 30 703
Oil 0.03 – 18.4 161 9,551
Biomass – – 4.63 43 2,276
Nuclear 0.003 0.019 0.052 0.22 –
Source: Markandya and Wilkinson (2007)
* Includes acute and chronic eﬀects. Chronic deaths are between 88% and 99% of total. For
nuclear, power, they include all cancer-related deaths.
** Includes respiratory and cerebrovascular hospital admissions, congestive heart failure, and
chronic bronchitis. For nuclear power, they include all non-fatal cancers and hereditary
eﬀects.
** Includes restricted activity days, bronchodilator use cases, cough, and lower-respiratory
symptom days in patients with asthma, and chronic cough episodes.
implications for Japan. Such adverse eﬀects are likely to compound the tragic
events of March 11.
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